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ABSTRACT:
Tenth of Ramadan is the first of several Egyptian
industrial new towns in the desert. Field research was
conducted in Egypt with government officials involved in the
project and in Sweden with planning consultants responsible
in part for its planning. Focusing on the issue of housing,
this study examines the contrasts between the current
situation and what was planned between 1976 and 1978 in terms
of the foreign planning consultant's role. Aimed at showing
the planners' perception of the nature of their involvement in
the project throughout its course, this case study purposes to
provide insights useful in general application to the field of
international planning practice.
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.EREFACE
This thesis is the result of nine weeks of field research
conducted in Egypt during the summer of 1982 with an Egyptian
colleague, Hoda Sakr, Ph.D. candidate in Urban Studies and
Planning, M.I.T., and in Sweden in February, 1983. Research
involved an investigation of the first Egyptian Industrial New
Town, Tenth of Ramadan, from two perspectives: the planning
and implementation of the project; and the adjustment to life
in the new town by the initial resident population. Informa-
tion on the implementation process was sought in interviews
conducted by my colleague with Egyptian government officials
involved in implementation. The issues of planning and imple-
mentation were addressed in interviews that I made with
several members of the Swedish planning team- Three weeks
were spent living in the new town, during which time I
conducted a visual documentation of its physical development.
noting the extent and nature of commercial and industrial
development and attempting, ultimately with limited success.
to get accurate, current census data. In-depth interviews
with a sample of fifty families of the initial resident popu-
lation were conducted by Ms. Sakr and myself with the aid of a
field research assistant. These interviews were designed to
get information on characteristics of the migrant, residential
conditions and attitudes toward life in the new town.
As Tenth of Ramadan is the first of several similar
projects planned by the Egyptian government to be implemented,
this study was conducted with the intention of providing
7
information useful to others involved in similar projects. It
was hoped that the information would be useful not only in the
specific terms of the Egyptian new town context, but also in
terms of examining the phenomenon of international planning
practice. The intention was that investigation of the
planning and implementation process of this project might
provide lessons from which government officials and practicing
professionals might learn and apply in future similar cases.
This research was funded in part by an Aga Khan Student
Travel Grant and by the Office of Special Programs of the Aga
Khan Program for Islamic Architecture at Harvard University
and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. I am grateful
for this support and also for the constant encouragement of
Mona Serageldin, Coordinator of Special Programs of the Aga
Khan Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. I
owe thanks to various individuals involved in Tenth of
Ramadan, in Egypt and in Sweden, without whose honesty,
hospitality and concern, this thesis would not have been
possible. For the encouragement of many friends, old and new,
in Egypt and in Cambridge, I am also grateful. I wish
especially to thank Lisa Redfield Peattie and John de Monchaux
for their many sensitive and insightful comments and the
intellectual provocation and support that made this truly a
learning experience. However, for what is here said, I claim
full responsibility.
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BACKGROUND
In 1974. in response to the increasing centralization of
industrialization and population in a few urban centers, the
Egyptian government, represented by the Ministry of Housing
and Reconstruction, initiated a program of developing new
communities in the desert. Its basic aims were to divert
growth from the crowded cities of Cairo and Alexandria and
arrest the encroachment of urban expansion on limited arable
land in the Nile Valley and Delta. It was intended that
growth should be diverted from the two metropoles and
attracted by several new self-sufficient cities in the desert,
namely, Tenth of Ramadan, Sadat City, Sixth of October, Al
Amal, El Obour, and New Ameriya. In 1974, the first step in
implementing the National Strategy for Urban Growth was the
initiation of planning for the new industrial new city of
Tenth of Ramadan, at that time merely referred to as "Cairo
New Town Northeast".
In September, 1974, the Ministry of Housing and Recon-
struction issued "Terms of Reference for the Industrial Area
and Associated City Master Plan Study," prepared by TAMS
(Tippetts-Abbett-McCarthy-Stratton), in response to the needs
arising
"due to increasing demands from international firms
for industrial sites near Cairo. The government
feels that this influx of new business should not
add to the overpopulation and congestion in Cairo
but rather should form the basis of a self-
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sufficient new city."1
In that same year, the Ministry selected SWECO. a Swedish firm-
in association with Shawky-Zeitoun, an Egyptian firm, to undertake
a Master Plan study for the proposed industrial area and its
associated city to be located fifty kilometers north-east of
Cairo on the desert road to Ismalia. The study was based on the
Terms of Reference and called for a Master Plan
"...to provide the Ministry with a guide for the
development of the industrial area and associated
city. A Master Plan is required that will provide
economic and physical justifications for industrial
investors and that will deal with the totality of
facilities and services necessary for a vital and
vigorous community.
The plan should be more than a statement of
desireable physical facilities. It must be con-
cerned with the economic feasibility of components
and with the procedures for their implementation.
The planning effort must reflect the basic
objectives of the Government in undertaking the
development of the Industrial Area. These
objectives are: to increase national and regional
income; to provide opportunities for relief of
population pressures in Cairo; to increase the
industrial base of the country; and to diversify
and improve employment opportunities." 2
In brief, according to the "Terms of Reference for a
Development Program and Construction Scheduling for Tenth of
Ramadan New Industrial City," the Master Plan should
"..serve as a guide to the Ministry of Development
and New Communities to construct a framework for
1 Arab Republic of Egypt Ministry of Housing and
Reconstruction, "Terms of Reference for the Industrial Area
and Associated City Master Plan Study," September 1974-p.l.
2 -hid., p. 2.
1n
initial settlement and future growth and
development of the city for the next twenty-five
years."3
The Master Plan of April 1976 was preceding by three earlier
reports, "Initial Report, May 1975, "Interim Report, July,
1975." and the "Draft Master Plan Report. 1976-" It was
organized into four sections, "Background to Tenth of
Ramadan," "Development Program," "Physical Planning," and
"First Stage Development." The background section looks at
the origin of the Master Plan and the role of Tenth of Ramadan
in the national and regional context. Issues addressed in the
development program include population projections. growth
prospects and restrictions, employment, industrial strategy,
financial evaluation, economic evaluation. social development
and objectives for planning. The plan's discussion on
physical planning deals with the basic planning approach, the
regional framework and site characteristics, the structure of
the city, industrial and residential area. the central area-
transportation and utilities. In the discussion of the first
stage of development, the plan addresses industrial areas for
the first stage, investment costs and scheduling.
In 1977, "Tenth of Ramadan, New Industrial City
Conceptual Planning Report," was prepared by SWECO and COPA,
the Egyptian firm replacing Shawky-Zeitoun on the project.
3 Arab Republic of Egypt Ministry of Development and New
Communities, "Terms of Reference for a Development Program and
Construction Scheduling (C.P.M.) for Tenth of Ramadan New
Industrial City," June 1978, p. 3.
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This report included a development strategy for population and
housing; a proposed industrial strategy; a set of maps for a
typical neighborhood unit; a proposal for the collection,
disposal, treatment, and recycling of solid wastes; and a
general geotechnical report.
In 1978, the "First Stage Final Report" was prepared by
SWECO and COPA, providing general plans for the implementation
of the first stage of development. The report included
sections on the national and regional context, land uses,
housing, industrial area. commercial centers, transportation
networks, telecommunications, water supply and sewerage,
electricity, waste disposal, climatology, landscape. soil
investigation, legal aspects and implementation.
Implementation was only addressed, however. in general terms.
Today, it may be seen that the development of Tenth of
Ramadan took a different route from that envisaged in the
preceding planning documents. With the exception of industry,
development in the city lags far behind original projections.
A point of fundamental importance is that in the Master Plan,
the first stage of development was to have been ten years in
length. However, by the time of the "First Stage Final
Report," the Ministry of Development and New Communities had
decided to accelerate the development of the first stage to
five years. That is, within a five year period, there was to
be a population of 150,000, construction of 30,000 dwellings
with complete infrastructure and the creation of 30.000 job
opportunities.
12
In 1982- in response to the actual status of the New
Town's development, the Minister of his own initiative
commissioned SWECO to conduct an evaluation study. Three
months in duration, it resulted in "Growth Plan 1982, Advisory
Service for Implementation and Management Assistance." Its
main purpose was to review and analyze the development of the
new town, identify shortcomings and potential future problems
and make recommendations for future action. The fate of this
report remains to be seen. The report was submitted for
comments and approval in May 1982. However, SWECO recieved no
response until the end of October, 1982. On the whole, the
report has not been well received and as such has yet to
receive final approval.
13
INTRODUCTION
"I can tell you the way things are, but 'why' is
still an open question." 4
The words of the Swedish Project Manager and Chief Advisor of
the Tenth of Ramadan new town project not only point to the
layers of complexity comprising the story of Tenth of Ramadan,
but also suggest inquiry into the positions of the planners in
this story. What follows is an attempt to put together the
pieces of this story, pieces taken from interviews with
government officials involved in implementation and from the
Swedish planners, into some kind of comprehensible picture
illustrating the nature of the role of the foreign planning
consultant in this case. Focusing on the issue of housing,
this study examines the contrasts between the situation at
present and what was planned in terms of the planner's role,
which in this case may be considered to be that of "advice-
giver."
The purpose of the following story is to show the
position that the planners perceived themselves to be in in
this context, what they hoped to achieve as "advice-givers",
what they considered to be limits to their effectiveness in
this role, and how they attempted to change their role in this
picture. It is suggested that such an examination might
provide insights useful in general application to the field of
international planning practice.
4 Alf Byden, Interview at SWECO. Stockholm, Sweden.
February, 1983.
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I. OVERVIEW OF PROPOSED HOUSING PROGRAM
"Both public and private community services
programs require implementation concurrently with
industrial housing construction."5
"I should stress the importance of having a system
that could bring out the major determinants for
community growth. Explicitly, they need some
system that makes them aware of what are the
elements and plans for growth -- the information
system is so bad now -- and translate this into a
coordinated development over the next couple of
years. For example, information about industrial
employment provides information on the size and
type of population which lets you know the amount
and type of housing needed, the number of schools
needed, etc." 6 (Swedish Planner)
The objective stated in the first quote above from the 1978
"Terms of Reference For a Development Program and Construction
Scheduling (C.P.M.) For Tenth of Ramadan New Industrial City,"
may still be seen in the words of one member of the Swedish
planning team, five years later.
Consistent with the attitude expressed above is what the
planners referred to as "a balanced development program" in
"TheConceptual Planning Report" of 1977. Considered to be
essential to ensure the successful development of the city, it
called for:
5 Arab Republic of Egypt Ministry of Development and New
Communities, "Terms of Reference for a Development Program and
Construction Scheduling (C.P.M.) for Tenth of Ramadan New
Industrial City," p. 8.
6 SWECO, Stockholm, Sweden, interview with member of
planning team, February, 1983.
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"a balanced industrial strategy, which emphasizes a
rapid industrial growth, but seeks to avoid
problems with an insufficient supply of services
and housing and a balanced housing programme, where
the criterion for selection of housing types is the
effective demand for housing of employees in Tenth
of Ramadan." 7
These elements of the overall "balanced development program"
related to the issue of housing were outlined as follows:
-"A rapid growth in construction of housing for the
population of the city"
-"A minimum of temporary housing or commuting to Tenth of
Ramadan"
-"A minimum of commuting to Cairo"
-"To avoid uncontrolled squatter settlements"
-"To maximize the number of housing units constructed
within a given government housing budget"
-"A housing construction program consistent with the
demand of the population of the city." 8
The discussion of the present housing situation in Tenth
of Ramadan will reveal the fate of these proposed objectives.
7 COPA and SWECO, "Tenth of Ramadan, New Industrial City
Conceptual Planning Report." 1977, p. 1-2.
8 Ibid., p. I-1.
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However, even in 1977 the planners took into account in
developing their balanced housing program various constraints
with the potential to limit the realization of such a
development strategy. These included limits to the capacity
of the construction industry, particularly in terms of
adequate supplies of materials and labor, land allocation
commitments made by the government; adequate provision of
services and infra-structure; and the prevalence of upper
income housing in the first two neighborhoods- 9  In
consideration of these objectives and constraints, the
planners proposed a housing program in which the range of
housing types selected would be based on the effective demand
of employees in the industrial and service sectors. 1 0
The proposed housing program was based on the analysis of
studies of employment characteristics, demographic character-
istics, population projections, the sizes and spending
patterns of households, economically feasible unit sizes and
9 bid., p. 1-2.
10 lb-bid., p. 1-21.
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costs, household income distribution and housing finance
systems. It was designed to meet the following objectives:
provision of affordable unit sizes for a range of income
groups; housing standards commensurate with acceptable
requirements and cost constraints; development of a housing
construction program; flexibility and capacity to meet the
effective demand for housing; and minimization of government
subsidies.
The basic housing policy, which generated the housing
program, as proposed by the planners was based on the concepts
that the housing stock should accommodate a range of income
groups and that it should provide a physical environment which
would allow for family privacy, yet at the same time encourage
neighborhood interaction. For the first stage of development,
the recommended housing policy called for the rapid
construction of a large number of units, a pilot project for
the purposes of stimulating development activities, the use of
a variety of construction methods in order to maximize
production, the construction of housing appropriate to a range
of income groups and the utilization of diverse forms of
investment including public, private and cooperative in order
to accelerate the development process. 11
11 COPA and SWECO, "Tenth of Ramadan First Stage Final
Report," 1978, p. 3:1.
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II. OVERVIEW OF THE STATUS OF HOUSING 1982
"The major shortcomings regarding the original
plans are not on the physical level but are related
to imbalances due to an unsuitable housing
programme, an d2 as a result thereof, slow migration
to the city."
The housing situation in Tenth of Ramadan in 1982
contrasted sharply with the six housing-related elements of
the proposed "balanced development program." While commuting
to Cairo is minimal and squatter settlements have not yet
developed, commuting to Tenth of Ramadan is quite common and
the rate and types of housing construction there are
inconsistent with the proposed objectives. Public
construction of housing has progressed at a slower rate than
scheduled and private ressidential construction has yet to
start. Moreover, the types of housing which have been built
appear to be inconsistent with the needs of the intended
residents, i.e., employees in the city. Consequently, the
people who were expected to live there do not. At the same
time, housing sits empty, as those who have bought it live
elsewhere.
12 SWECO, "Tenth of Ramadan, New Industrial City Growth
Plan 1982, Final Report," January, 1983, p.i.
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Public Construction of Housing
Development to Date: 1982
"Housing is far behind and is not the right kind of
housing." 1 3 (Swedish Planner)
Despite the fact that in November of 1977, four
contractors were contracted to build 1,344 housing units
within 13 months, as of March 1982 none of these contracts had
yet been completed. 1 4  Moreover, with few new contracts
initiated since 1977, housing construction continues to be
slow. While the Tenth of Ramadan Development Authority
planned to begin construction of 5,000 units in the summer of
1982, as of Spring, 1982, the number of housing units
constructed totalled 3,600.15
What Was Proposed: 1976-1978
In contrast to this situation, the planners had suggested
a housing construction program of 3,000 dwellings in 1978 and
3,000 to 4,000 per year thereafter.1 6 According to schedule
there would have been at least 12,000 units built by the end
of 1981. The "First Stage Final Report" stated that a
13 SWECO, Stockholm, Sweden, interview with member of
Planning team, February, 1983.
14 SWECO, "Tenth of Ramadan New Industrial City Growth
Plan 1982 Draft Final Report", April, 1982, p. 3:2.
15 lbid., p. 1:8.
16 COPA and SWECO, "First Stage Final Report." p. 3:35.
SWECO and Shawky-Zeitoun, "Tenth of Ramadan New Industrial
City Master Plan," April, 1976, p. 51.
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cooperative society and five private contractors were already
involved in the construction of conventional housing and that
two other contractors were involved in prefabricated
construction in 1978.17
The planners projected the time phasing of the proposed
housing construction program based on assumptions about the
number of households moving to the city by a certain time.
These assumptions are represented in Figures 1 and 2.18
Based on 1978 prices, the planners estimated the total
cost for housing to be LE 70,256,030 including the costs of
construction works, internal sanitary and electrical works and
connection to the public network. 1 9
In the 1978 "First Stage Final Report," the planners
explicitly addressed the severe constraints on the housing
construction industry in Egypt. These included shortages of
manufactured building materials and problems of transporting
raw materials, as well as the severe shortage of construction
labor due to better employment opportunities offered in the
oil-rich Arab countries. In response, they recommended that
housing construction in the city be supported by "the creation
of early transportation channels to the new city, adequate
supplies of building materials, utilization of the surrounding
17 COPA and SWECO, "First Stage Final Report." p. 3:35.
18 COPA and SWECO, "Conceptual Planning Report." p. 1-3.
19 COPA and SWECO, "First Stage Final Report." p. 14:13.
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Figure 1.Number of households moving to Tenth
of Ramadan per year
(Adapted from: "Conceptual Planning Report")
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Figure 2. Assumed housing construction programme for Tenth of Ramadan
(Adapted from: "Conceptual Planning Report")
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quarries and encouragement of various building material
workshops in the city." 2 0
The planners' discussion of implementation of the housing
program was based on the following list of points which they
suggested be "considered" to ensure achievement of the basic
objective of provision of housing of a range of standards.
"-The ministry should not increase the proportion
of luxury and above medium residential units but
can vary that under construction in the First
Stage.
-Start the construction of industrial and public
housing from the beginning.
-Redistribute land reserved for inhabitants and
societies to those who are serious applicants
prepared to construct quickly.
-Reservation of residential land for industrial
organizations.
-Study means of attracting people prepared to
construct, e.g.,
Preparation of model residential units with
different standards, prices and construction
times.
Study building costs together with contractors
in order to reduce cost per residential unit.
Attempt to make building materials easily
available with fast delivery at reasonable
prices.
Securing of long-term loans for building houses
with a low interest rate.
Setting up a residential bank.
Preparation of detailed plans for the second,
20 Lbid., pp. 3-35.
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third, and fourth stages." 21
Using the recommendations outlined in the "Growth Plan 1982"
as a likely indication of the limited realization of the above
listed points for "consideration", it may be seen that the
planners were still urging that the following suggestions be
taken:
"As there at present is very little affordable
housing available to industrial workers, a new
housing programme should be developed providing the
right housing types to the right costs and with
appropriate financing of different kinds."
"In order to find the necessary land for this large
number of workers, a Land Management Plan that can
'unlock' the city by rebuying or redistributing the
land is a necessity."
"Observe the possible constraint represented by the
construction sector and try all ways of
developments...(including) establish a building
materials depot;"
"Create a special savings bank and other financial
instruments for low income groups."
"Start planning parts of Stage Two of the city to
meet the increasing demand for land from
industry. "22
What Happened: 1978-1982
Despite the planners' concern that shortages of
construction materials would impose constraints on building,
according to one Egyptian official, this situation was short-
lived.
21 Ibid., pp. 14-3.
22 SWECO, "Growth Plan 1982 Draft Final Report." pp. x,xi.
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"There was a shortage of cement for sometime, but
after the open-door policy we could import the
quantities needed and we were given priority. Now
we have no shortage of any of the construction
materials."i23 (Egyptian Official)
It appears that the constraints that did have a serious impact
on building were administrative in nature, and thus more
difficult to control.
"Each new town is supposed to get tenders from
contractors and submit them to the Ministry in a
bundle and then it's cut up. What contractors must
do because they're bidding for something in the
future is to project costs - which are of course
higher and then wait around to see whether or not
they get the job. "24 (Swedish Planner)
This system of administering contracts, which requires the
contractor to submit prepared bids and then wait for
acceptance or rejection, is obviously more feasible for large
contractors with regular activities that allow them to sustain
themselves during the waiting period. Furthermore, given the
rapid rate of increases in construction costs in Egypt, this
system forces the bids submitted for future work to be
inflated.
Another administrative constraint acting on the level of
23 Tenth of Ramadan Development Authority, Tenth of
Ramadan, Egypt, interview with government official, June,
1982-
24 SWECO, Stockholm, Sweden, interview with member of
planning team, February, 1983.
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construction activity is the way that contracts are awarded to
large public sector contractors given the overall limited
supply of building materials and labor available to the
construction industry in Egypt. In this case. when contracts
are awarded, the government makes a large advance downpayment
which must later be repaid. Consequently, the incentive is
for the contractor to roll twenty percent over into his own
firm and to delay the start of construction- 25
According to the Swedes, the use of large contractors was
a reflection of the Egyptians' view of Tenth of Ramadan as one
large construction project. The planners contended that
small-scale contractors could have produced better housing
cheaper. Stressing the potential for savings in this case,
they suggested that the realm of large-scale public
contractors should have been limited to public buildings.26
Private Construction of Housinc
Development to Date: 1982
"Housing is slow on private land. We take it as an
unhealthy sign. They are waiting for the situation
to clarify before risking the capital to build.
Nothing is being done to force them to build, so
obviously it's not for themselves to live that they
bought the land. Until last spring, they'd just
written letters to the land owners stating that
25 Ministry of Development. Cairo. Egypt, interview,
June, 1982.
26 SWECO, Stockholm, Sweden, interview with member of
planning team, February, 1983.
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they must come up with drawings within 3 months and
they must build within 3 years. I asked to see the
letters and was shown around 11,"27 (Swedish
Planner)
As of spring of 1982. no residential construction had
been started in Tenth of Ramadan either by private individuals
or cooperatives, despite the low acquisition costs of land.
What Was Proposed, What Happened: 1976-1982
In the financial analysis summarized in the Master Plan
of 1976, the planners recognized the possibility that the
financial resource constraint could become serious.
Consequently, they stressed that the land policy chosen could,
and indeed should, play a vitally important role in revenue
generation. They proposed that rather than selling title to
the land, the government should lease it at annual rates
reflecting its increasing value. 2 8 However, the residential
land allocation policy actually put into effect in 1977 was
the result of a political decision reputedly made in response
to resource constraints.
"...for political reasons. at Sadat's request. land
was sold at a price that was never deduced from any
figure. It was decided to announce the selling of
land in the city, at fifty piasters per meter and
adding LE 1.50 to 3.00 per meter for infrastructure
according to the size of the land, for residential,
27 SWECO, Stockholm, Sweden, interview with member of
planning team, February, 1983.
28 SWECO and Shawky-Zeitoun. "Master Plan," p. 19.
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the lots were announced to be 600 meters squared
irrespective of the proposed structural plan." 2 9
(Egyptian Official)
"In 1977, they sold out the whole city at a price
not even close to the cost of provision of
infrastructure...but the poor in general didn't
even have that much. Therefore, middle and upper
class speculators now are sitting on the land
waiting for development to come." 3 0 (Swedish
Planner)
The sale of land was announced by the Ministry of
Development in the official paperAl Ahram, before the first
phase infrastructure drawings had even been completed. This
was a political decision based on the intent to raise the
resources to finance the initial stages of the city's
development. However, the price announced did not even
reflect the actual cost of servicing the land, which at that
time was approximately LE 30 per meter. Consequently, this
represented a substantial subsidy from the government- It was
hoped that this move would encourage migration to the city. A
downpayment of 25 percent of the price was required and a
formal commitment of land ownership was made to the buyer.
However, no specification as to the location of the land was
made.
29 Tenth of Ramadan Development Authority, Tenth of
Ramadan, Egypt, interview with government official, June,
1982-
30 SWECO, Stockholm, Sweden, interview with member of
planning team, February, 1983.
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"We heard that within only a few days 17,000 lots
were sold. That was the figure that we heard at
the time. Originally, the lots were to be 600
square meters, which are large. There was no
guarantee that these people would be connected with
the city. The effect is a housing stock that is
unusable. The purchasers do not have t e personal
or economic pressure to develop it." (Swedish
Planner)
The response to the sale of the land was overwhelming and
resulted in the reservation of 4.5 million square meters, an
area 1.5 times greater than that designated for residential
use in the first stage of development. The planners' concern
over the conflicts that the situation might precipitate led
them to include in the appendix of the "First Stage Final
Report"of 1978 recommendations for a land parcelling policy
for the new city. They stressed the importance of the design
of the policy, particularly because of its influence on that
of the other new towns. The aim of the proposed policy was to
allow most applicants to maintain their claims on reserved
land and thus avoid a situation in which government policy on
ownership would be violated by the denial to a substantial
number of applicants of their reserved plots. 3 2 The planners
suggested that the government might be able to maintain its
obligation to applicants by offering them as an alternative
31 SWECO, Stockholm, Sweden, interview with member of
planning team, February, 1983.
32 COPA and SWECO, "First Stage Final Report." Appendix
1, p. 1.
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the option on a dwelling or an apartment. 3 3  Citing the
possibility that the demand for such options might prove to be
overwhelming, the planners recommended that the government
should be prepared with a policy for dealing with the demand,
such as providing refunds to applicants not willing to change
their requirements. 3 4 It was hoped that expanding the options
available to applicants would allow the majority of them to be
accommodated during the first stage of development. The
planners noted that this would be economically advantageous in
that it would enable the government to revise prices for later
stages more in line with the costs of infrastructure. 35
The Ministry attempted to cope with this situation by
contacting applicants by mail, requesting information on their
financial ability to build, and seeking their approval to
reduce the size of the lot or exchange it for an apartment.
On the whole, the idea of smaller lot sizes was met with
opposition. Despite this fact, lots were initially reduced to
70-450 square meters. 3 6 Additional protest by the buyers
brought the lot size up to 120-450 square meters. 3 7 However,
3 Iid., p. 2.
34 Ibid.
35Ibid.
36 Cairo, Egypt, private interview with government
official, July, 1982.
37 Cairo, Egypt, private interview with government
official, July, 1982.
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some applicants did accept apartments as alternatives. One
government official made the point that, while the Master Plan
Study cost $2 million, the city was sold for less. 3 8 Moreover.
in such an open sale of land, the only requirement for
ownership was the ability to pay. No priority was given to
workers in the city. Obviously, it was not the poor but the
middle and upper classes who were able to take advantage of
this offer, many, it is felt, for speculative purposes. The
inevitable result was that a large portion (8.000 lots) of the
First Stage were committed to people without any guarantee
that they would have any involvement in the city.
Among the conditions included in the lot contracts were
the following of particular importance given the situation at
present:
"Second party should get the license for building
the piece of land and start the building work
within one year from signing the contract (this
generally means maximum one year from informing the
land owner that the utilities have been connected).
He should finish the building works within three
years including the previous year or the Authority
will have the right to cancel the contract and get
back the land by paying back the money originally
paid by the second party (deducting 10% for admin-
istrative costs)" (unofficial translation) 3 9
However, as of the spring of 1982, no lot contracts for
individual housing had yet been signed. Prospective owners
had been registered by the Tenth of Ramadan Development
38 Ministry of Development. Cairo. Egypt, interview with
government official, June, 1982.
39 SWECO, "Growth Plan 1982 Draft Final Report. p. 5-2.
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Authority and assigned a lot number. Those prospective owners
whose lots had recently been provided with utility connections
were notified and requested to respond within two months with
their intentions about building. However, the condition that
construction commence within one year was not included in
letters shown to the planners conducting the "Growth Plan"
study.40
"After fighting we were able to get names and [one
of our team] tried to find people. She had letters
of introduction from the city with the authority to
interview them. 25% didn't exist, others were
people interested in living in 1OR and others were
clearly not.'4l (Swedish Planner)
The study team attempted to interview applicants during
the spring of 1982- Their efforts to locate people met with
mixed results. While some people were anxious to start
construction, others were not. Moreover, one quarter of the
addresses proved to be those of ministries, empty lots, etc.,
rather than addresses of applicants. At the same time, the
study team prepared a questionnaire to be sent with a cover
letter from the Authority requesting information about the
future land owner, desired date of construction, phasing of
construction, type of building planned, etc.
40 Ibid.
41 SWECO, Stockholm, Sweden, interview with member of
planning team, February, 1983.
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The major problems in the future development of the city,
resulting from the way in which land has been allocated, were
addressed in "Growth Plan 1982." In brief, these problems
are: the inevitable shortage of land available to present and
future workers in industry, which the planners stressed
represents an irresolvable problem given the existing land
management systems and government housing policy; the
economically inefficient use of investment in infrastructure
and services and dispersed settlement inherent in the
probability of limited private construction over the next five
years; and finally the threat posed to the original objective
of creating an "independent" city by the sale of land to those
with no guaranteed involvement in the city. 42
"We are secluded from the political decision-making
that influences our work with little chance to
react. For example, when Sadat sold the city, it
came to us as a total surprise. He blew the chance
for something to be good. My point is that there's
no chance to react to political decision-making
before it is too late." 43 (Swedish Planner)
The impact of one political decision on the present and future
development of the city suggests strongly the marginal
position of the planner in this story. It is obvious that
despite the financial and economic analyses conducted by the
42 SWECO, "Growth Plan 1982 Draft Final Report." pp. 5-4.
5-5.
SWECO, Stockholm, Sweden, interview with member of
planning team, February, 1983.
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planners, and their recommendations about project cost
recovery and land allocation policy as a primary source of
revenue generation, their impact on "result" was virtually
negated by the political power of one man. This example
illustrates the potential impotence inherent in the role of
the international consultant and its relation to the context
of implementation. Segregated from the arena of political
decision-making which profoundly impacts the results of their
plans, the consultant's role is virtually limited to that of a
powerless advisor.
"I have a feeling that during Sadat it was going
from mild socialism to capitalism. It's quite
clear that political behavior is influencing the
planning. A change in political system must
influence the result." 44 (Swedish Planner)
One can only surmise as to the motivations behind
President Sadat's decision. While it was reputedly intended
to provide financial resources for the city's early stages of
development, the absence of any prior analysis in this regard
and the inefficiency, indeed failure, of this decision in
achieving the objectives is obvious. It is clear that the
beneficiaries of the decision were members of the middle and
upper classes. If the weight of their political leverage is
recognized, then one might speculate that this political
decision as made with the intention of maintaining the support
44
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of this group. In fact, could one assume that given the
recent political history and present political context, the
President of Egypt would be able to remain in office without
the support of the middle and upper classes? This situation
suggests the impact of the larger political context on the
realization of a program or plan, and the limits to the
effectiveness of the planner as advice-giver. Given the per-
spective espoused in the planners' recommended land allocation
policy, it is unlikely that any number of such recommendations
would have sufficient leverage to counter the force of the
overall political context.
Population and Housing Stock
Development to Date: 1982
While a basic objective in the development of the city
was the provision of housing and services to those employed
there, the current situation is a different story. If this
objective is accepted as valid, then it must be concluded that
the housing constructed thus far is in one way or another
inappropriate to the needs of a large portion of the target
population. Not only does population growth fall short of
original projections, but seventy percent of those employed in
the city, who are supposed to be the 'core' of the community,
live outside the city. 4 5  Yet at the same time, even with
SWECO, "Growth Plan 1982 Draft Final Report." p. 1-3.
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housing construction far behind schedule, unit upon unit of
built housing sits empty. One encounters entire blocks of
vacant flats in the city as well as whole clusters of villas
similarly locked and empty. In contrast to a first stage
population of 150,000 as initially projected, the population
according to the SWECO report for March 1982 was only 3200.46
This figure includes 750 single males, with the balance
comprising 650 families. The majority of the 750 men are
married but living alone in the city, having come for
purposes of employment. 4 7
Approximately 90 apartments have been provided, on the
whole rent-free, by the Tenth of Ramadan Development Authority
to house the single men. 4 8 Furthermore, there were estimated
to be about 40 tents around the city housing workers. 4 9 The
SWECO report estimates that only 20 percent of the population
of single men pays rent. 5 0 Most of the 650 families live in
apartment blocks. Of these families, 40 percent own their
apartment. having purchased them under ordinary financing
conditions, i.e., a downpayment of 10 percent of the cost of
construction with the balance to be paid over 30 years with 3
46 Ibid., p. 1-5.
47 lbid., p. 1-6.
48
49ibid.
50Ibid.
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percent interest. 5 1 Approximately 50 percent of the families
rent their housing. The majority of these are employed by the
Tenth of Ramadan Development Authority. 5 2 The proportion of
housing which sits empty in Tenth of Ramadan is one extremely
obvious characteristic of the city. As of spring 1982, only
30 percent of the 3600 units constructed had been allocated,
50 percent sold, and 20 percent were still free. 5 3 Moreover.
only 20 percent of the built units were occupied and only 40
percent of those sold were inhabited. 5 4
"Misallocation has led to disastrous consequences.
They must recognize what kind of town it should be
- it's not Islamabad or Brasilia - but an
Industrial City - Therefore it will have industrial
labor and therefore you would end up with the kind
of housing that you don't see in Tenth of Ramadan.
LE 6 - 12 is far beyond the paying capacity of an
industrial laborer- The kind of housing they can
afford ou don't see now and won't see for years to
come." 5 (Swedish Planner)
"A New Industrial Independent City. Nobody cared
about the word "Industrial", some people read NEW
city, some people read INDEPENDENT city. OK, you
can put i dustry, but we don't want any industrial
workers. " 6 (Swedish Planner)
51 Ibid., p. 1-7.
52 ibid.
53 Tid. p. 1-8.
54 Ibid.
55 SWECO, Stockholm, Sweden, interview with member of
planning team, February, 1982.
56 Ibid.
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As of March 1982, there were 4200 people employed in Tenth of
Ramadan. 5 7  Of these, less than 30 percent actually were
living in the city, i.e., 1500 residents and 2700 living
elsewhere- 5 8  While in the construction sector the number of
workers varies, the total was 1000 at that time- 5 9 Formal
housing had not been made available to them. Consequently,
the majority commuted, while others lived in tents in the
city. Approximately 30 percent of those employed in industry
and approximately 70 percent of those employed in public and
commercial services were living in the city as shown in the
Table 1 from "Growth Plan, 1982.",60
The average income level of employees in Tenth of
Ramadan was 2 percent higher in 1982 than the national
average, with 65 percent of the working population earning
between LE 800 and LE 1200 annually. 6 1  Sixty percent of
those employed in industries were earning between LE 1200 and
LE 2000 per year. 6 2 Considering the anticipated growth in
this sector, the planners stressed the urgent need for
affordable housing to accommodate these workers. Table 2
57 SWECO, "Growth Plan 1982 Draft Final Report." p. 1-2.
58 Ibid
59 Ihid.
60 lbid., p. 1-3.
61 Ibi., p. 1-4.
62 lbid.
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TABLE 1: Place of Residence According to Sector of Employment
Living in Living TOTAL
the City Elsewhere
No. % No. % No. %
Construction 100 7 900 33 1000 24
Industry 400 27 1400 52 1800 43
Administration 650 43 250 9 900 19
Services & Commerce 350 23 150 6 500 14
TOTAL 1500 100 2700 100 4200 100
(source: "GROWTH PLAN 1982")
TABLE 2: Persons Working in Tenth of Ramadan by Yearly Income
(Percent) 1982
LE/YEAR
<800 800-1200 1200-2000 .2000 TOTAL
Sector
Construction* 1 90 7 2 100
Industry* 5 32 60 3 100
Administration 1 93 4 2 100
Services and
Commerce 13 83 4 0 100
*SWECO estimates
(source: adapted from "GROWTH PLAN 1982")
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represents the distribution of income according to sector. 6 3
Income regularity as well as income level is a factor
influencing the housing program. Over 50 percent of the
labor force receives a daily income. 6 4  The insecurity
inherent in this system is obvious. In recognition of this
fact, the planners stressed the need for a housing system
which could accommodate people even when they are temporarily
not working, for example, when ill.
What Was Proposed: 1976 - 1978
In accordance with their general objectives of providing
housing that would be affordable and appropriate to a range of
income groups and at the same time minimize the level of
government subsidization, the planners proposed a housing
construction program in their planning documents based on a
series of studies. Given the discrepancy between overall
population projections made during the planning process and
the actual population in 1982, the limits to the validity of
the following projections are obvious. In order to determine
the effective demand for housing and this its physical
characteristics, the planners projected the distribution of
household incomes in Tenth of Ramadan. First, they made a
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid., p. 1-5.
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forecast of the city's employment structure according to
sector and year. Then using available statistical data. they
determined the assumed average annual wages according to
sector. They then considered the number of employees per
household over time and the employment structure of the second
employee of the household in order to determine the average
household income for inhabitants of the city, which
facilitated the estimation of the distribution of households
according to income. This distribution was categorized as
follows:
Very low income less than 200 LE/year
Low income 200 - 500 LE/year
Medium income 500 - 900 LE/year
Upper medium income 900 - 1500 LE/year
High income more than 1500 LE/year 65
In this regard the planners projected the following distribution
of household incomes as shown in Table 3.66 It is interestsing
to note that while LE 617 was the projected average household
income for 1982. The actual 1982 figure is much higher. between
LE 800 and LE 1200.
The profile of household incomes shown in Table 3
indicated to the planners the need for a housing program
within the financial reach of the large percentage of
households in lower income categories in the early period of
65 COPA and SWECO, "Conceptual Planning Report." p. 1-25.
66 Ibid.
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TABLE 3: Household Income Distribution in Tenth of Ramadan
Average
House-
hold Distribution by income brackets: Percent
Year Income, LE <200 200-500 500-900 900-1500 .1500
1980 578 20 42 18 13 7
1982 617 19 39 20 13 9
1987 695 16 34 23 14 13
1992 757 13 32 25 15 15
1997 835 10 30 27 16 17
2002 938 7 28 29 17 19
(source: "CONCEPTUAL PLANNING REPORT." 1977)
development. 67  The planners explicitly warned against the
consequences of failing to provide housing for these groups.
These consequences included the proliferation of uncontrolled
squatter settlements and the possible jeopardization of
industrial development, which in turn could prevent the
development of the city as a self-sufficient settlement and
prohibit the achievement of the population target of 500.000
for year 25.68
The planners estimated affordable annual costs for
housing based on projections of household income and
assumptions about household expenditure patterns for housing.
In order to define affordable sizes and standards of housing,
42
the planners estimated the construction costs for various
types of housing over time. They used the description of the
current housing finance system in Egypt as presented in the
report. "Housing Finance in Egypt," by the Ministry of Housing
and Reconstruction and the U.S. Agency for International
Development, to reach assumptions concerning housing finance.
They then determined housing sizes demanded by different
income brackets based on household spending patterns and
housing construction costs. Figure 3 illustrates what the
planners had assumed would be the possible financing options
available to different types of households. 6 9
The planners then developed guidelines for housing sizes
which would be affordable for families of various income
levels. They stressed the importance of using these
calculations in determining housing types and floor area per
67 Ibid., p. 1-27.
68 Ibid.
69 bid., p. 1-35.
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FIGURE 3: Assumed conditions of loans for different types of
housing to be developed by year 0-5. (Interest rates
in the Private Market - 7 %)
Household Income. LE/year
<200 200-500 500-900 900-1500 .1500
No down No down 10% down 15% down 15% down
payment payment payment payment payment
3% 3% 4% 5% 5%
30 yrs 30 yrs 30 yrs 30 yrs 25 yrs
Projects financed through
the national housing fund
or direct from the
Government budget
Projects financed through
NHF or the general autho-
rity of building coopera-
tives or direct from the
Government budget
Project financed through
GAOBC or the credit
foncier
Projects financed
through the credit
foncier. commercial
banks or insurance
companies
It is presupposed that the down payment will be used to pay
the costs for land and technical infrastructure-
The conditions presented above also presuppose the development
of an efficiently working private sector for housing finance
with larger funds and longer terms for loans than available
today.
(source: "CONCEPTUAL PLANNING REPORT." 1977)
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flat, etc., in planning neighborhood units. For the first
stage, they stressed that the figures pointed to the need for
the construction of a large percentage of small flats, i.e.,
80 percent of the housing units should be less that 56 square
meters in area. 7 0
One purpose of the economic evaluation of the project
was the definition of feasible levels of standards for
various components of the city, including housing, given the
constraints imposed by household incomes. The planners con-
sidered different levels of standards, including an alterna-
tive with a comparatively high standard for housing. They
concluded, however, that to build this level of housing would
necessitate unrealistically high levels of investment and
government subsidy, particularly considering the fact that
only 2 percent of the projected national increase in urban
70 Ibhi., p. 1-37. COPA and SWECO. "First Stage Final
Report," p. 3:6.
45
population would be accommodated in the city. 7 1 Furthermore.
they stressed that "levels of standards implying high sub-
sidies will have the effect that the poorer strata of the
population cannot be provided any conventional housing at all,
which is both an inefficient and inequitable solution-"7 2
They advised research into the range of housing standards that
could be provided with various levels of subsidies. Further
more, they suggested alternatives such as self-help programs,
reductions in floor area per capita or lower standards of
finishing, etc., as means of reducing construction costs to
provide housing affordable to the lowest income groups. 7 3
They recommended that housing be an area for economizing
because of its potential for future upgrading as compared with
social or technical infrastructure, which must be of higher
standards from the start in order to be adequate in a longer
time perspective. 7 4
In sum, as a result of their economic analysis, the
planners outlined factors which would improve the economic
justification of the project. Those of relevance to this
discussion of housing include the minimization of government
housing subsidies and thus a reduction of standards which
71 SWECO and Shawky-Zeitoun. "Master Plan." p. 20.
72 Ibid., p. 21
73 
-bd
74 bid.
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would in turn reduce costs and facilitate the construction of
more dwellings for the same amount of investment and the
reduction of housing costs through self-help construction and
the creation of a central pool of building materials and the
provision of technical and financial assistance. 7 5
The housing proposed in the "First Stage Final Report" in
1978 was designed in consideration of the following socio-
economic parameters: the social characteristics of he
migrants, whether employment in the city is permanent or
temporary, social mobility, religion, differing lifestyles of
the members of each sex, age structure and household
compositions and sizes, household income distribution,
geographical distribution of income groups. activity rates and
employment structure and affordable annual rents for
housing.76
The planners proposed five levels of housing construc-
tion costs: high cost at LE 70 per meter squared, upper
medium cost at LE 60 per meter squared, medium cost at LE52
per meter squared, lower medium at LE 45 per meter squared,
and low- and very low-cost at less than LE 35 per meter
squared. 7 7  Based on these assumptions. guidelines were
established for housing sizes that would be affordable to a
range of income groups. It was concluded that during the
75 lbid., p. 23.
76 SWECO and Shawky-Zeitoun. "First Stage Final Report."
p. 3:9-3:14.
77 Ibid., p. 3:15.
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first stage a large number of small apartments should be
built. Figure 4 illustrates affordable housing sizes
projected per household for the first five years of this
project. 7 8
The planners proposed a range of housing types intended
to reflect the previously mentioned socio-economic parameters.
They suggested as suitable housing types small apartments
rather than the conventional large flats, particularly from an
economic perspective. They suggested that prefabricated
construction, with proper planning and design, and with the
benefits of quick construction and standardization, could
reduce the costs of housing through maximization of
production.7 9
Extendable as opposed to confined housing units, such as
corehouses and "Sites and Services" were recommended, based
on consideration of the amounts available to spend on housing,
the intention to minimize government subsidization and changes
in family sizes. 80 The housing types proposed in the "First
Stage Final Report" included "Sites and Services," core
housing, a variety of apartment blocks and court houses.
In their discussions of "Sites and Services", the plan-
ners pointed out its advantages, potential disadvantages, the
role of the government, and an implementation procedure.
78 ibid.
79 lbid., p. 3:16-
80 Ibid
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Figure 4 Affordable Housing Size per Household
Years 0-5
Dwelling oreo m2
(source:
Household income
groups LE/year
Household income
distribution
year 0-5
"First Stage Final Report")
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To ensure that the efforts of families in such a self-help
program are productively channelled, the government should
offer technical advice and social assistance as well as
supplying sites, services, and minimum specifications for land
development. 8 1  The planners recommended a wide range of
serviced sites, from bare sites with no facilities to larger
lots with individual utility connections in order to accom-
modate a spectrum of income levels. This was suggested in
order to avoid a situation in which unnecessarily high
standards and large lot sizes prohibit availability to the
poor. "Sites and Services" was considered to be economically
advantageous in that it is less costly than public housing
projects, and it places more responsibility on the private
sector than the public sector. An important advantage seen by
the planners was that it facilitates simultaneous saving and
investment because "much of the saving needed can be mobilized
directly, in kind, rather than indirectly, through financial
intermediaries." 8 2 Furthermore- the future owner's control
over the construction process in terms of technique and
phasing promotes self-reliance. 8 3
The planners urged that the role of the government be
secondary to that of the future occupants in ensuring the
81 Ibid., p. 3:18.
82 bi., p. 3:20-
83Ibd
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successful implementation of such a project. However, they
stressed that creating a viable community implies more than
the construction of physical facilities. Consequently, they
suggested that the future inhabitants, with the encouragement
of local leadership, must be active in the organized
development of their new community by instituting occupant-
controlled, local decision making and management processes;
through involvement in housing construction; by creating
cooperative and social and economic programs; and by
instituting local credit and savings mechanisms. 8 4 The
planners saw the government as responsible for the provision
of the technical and organizational skills required by the
inhabitants in these efforts.
The planners recommended the provision for low income
groups of core housing which would be low cost and facilitate
future extension by the occupants. They suggested the
provision of core houses in different stages of development,
including some that are completely developed which could
provide examples for the occupants, to accommodate a range of
household requirements. The stages of development ranged
from one room and small bath to four rooms, a bath and
kitchen on two stories. 8 5
Four types of apartment blocks were proposed. The first,
84 lbid., p. 3:21-
85 Ibid., p. 3:22-
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"C-1," has four stories, with two flats of 100 meters squared
per floor, on a lot of 600 meters squared. These are intended
for upper-medium and medium income families of four to six
individuals.86 The "C-2" type also has four stories with two
flats of 90 meters squared per floor on a 500 square meter
lot. It is intended for families of three to four persons of
the medium and upper-medium income levels. 8 7 The "C-3" type
is for high and upper-medium income households. It has four
stories with three dwellings per floor. 8 8 Type "C-4," again
four stories, was designed for medium and lower-medium income
families of three to four or four to six persons. 8 9
Two types of court houses were proposed. The first, "C-
5." has two stories each of 60 meters squared on a 150 square
meter lot and was designed for a three to five person family
of the medium and upper-medium income levels. 9 0 Type "B-1"
was designed for high income families of three to four
persons and upper-medium income families of four to six.
These two-unit dwellings sit on a 225 square meter lot, with
each unit occupying 125/135 square meters. 9 1 The types of
86 Ibid., p. 3:25-
87 Ibid.
88 lbid., p. 3:28.
89 Ibid., p. 3:29.
90 Ibijd., p. 3:31-
91 bid.,r p. 3: 33.
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housing recommended for the first phase are summarized in
Ta 9 2_ _hl_ 4-92
What Happened: 1978-1982
In contrast to the planners' recommendations, Table 5
shows the types of housing already built or under
construction as of the spring of 1982.93 Notable are the
marked discrepancies between the costs of units proposed and
those actually built. For example, while only 40% of the
proposed housing was to have cost more than 2800 LE per unit,
100% of that actually constructed cost more than this amount.
Moreover, the highest cost proposed per unit was 4400 LE. In
contrast 68 percent of the units constructed cost more than
6500 LE. Thus, it may be seen that in terms of size and cost
of construction the housing stock actually built tends toward
higher standards than that originally proposed.
Table 6 represents the housing planned for construction
by the Tenth of Ramadan Development Authority. Construction
of these 5000 units was to have commenced in July of 1982.94
SWECO's reactions to the Development Authority's plans
focused on two issues. First, they thought that the plan to
build the core flats in Neighborhood 14 and the economy and
92 COPA and SWECO, "Conceptual Planning Report." p. 1-45.
93 SWECO, "Growth Plan 1982 Draft Final Report." p. 3-2.
94 Ibid., p. 3-4.
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TABLE 4: Characteristics of housing proposed for the first
House- Recom'd Afforded No. of Afford- Approx. Share
hold type of size of fam/ able lot of
income bldg bldg unit cost/ size total
(LE/yr) (m2 ) unit (m2 )
Low rise
<200 building <14 1) 600 LE 100 20%
flexible
Low rise
200- building 14-32 1) 1400 LE 100 40%
500 flexible ave:25 1,0
3-4 storey 75%
bldgs, 1-2 25-56 1,0 2900 LE 100 20%
500- bdrms/flat ave:40 25%
900 or low rise 300
2-4 storey 50%
900- bldgs, 1-3 40-71 1,0 4400 LE 300 12%
1500 bdrms/flat ave:65 50%
low rise 600
2-4 storey 25%
bldgs, 1-3 300 8%
>1500 bdrms/flat 40- 1,0 2800 LE 75%
or low rise. 600
1)14m 2 per household is evidently not an acceptable standard
of living. Therefore, solutions with several households
sharing facilities like for example bathrooms may be
feasible. Other solutions are self help activities based on
organized site and service schemes-
(source: "CONCEPTUAL PLANNING REPORT." 1977)
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TABLE 5: Summary of Housing Construction
Spring 1982
in Tenth of Ramadan,
Type of housing
Area, m2
lot/floor
No. of
units
Approximate
Cost LE
Core house 90/18 2890 1979
type 2 90/29 3246 "
90/40 121 3601 "
90/55 3957 "
Core house 96/22 3083 "
type 3 96/38 105 3498 "
96/62 4328 "
Core house 120/23 3853
type 4 120/38 172 4268
120/79 5514
Core house 90/24 2940
type 6 90/37 102 3332
90/49 3725
90/62 4117
Four story
standard
apartment buildings
Type 1 110 1064 6500 1978
2 86 568 5600 "
" 3 130 96 9000 1982
" 4a 68 40 4300 1978
4b 95 40 5500 "
Prefabricated
units
Arab
Contractors 77 and 88 268 6725-7520 "
Bilbeis
Contractors 91 586 6200
Villas
Attached 100 178 11000 "
Semi detached 100 198 11500 "
Detached 100 49 12500 "
Total number of units 3567
(source: "GROWTH PLAN 1982")
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Constr-
Year
Currently Planned Housing Construction
Type of housing No. of
units
No. of rooms
Approximate
expected cost/
unit 1982 prices
(SWECO Estimates)
(LE)
Core flats
(4 story)
Economy
housing
1,000
2,400
400 1 room
1200 2 "
800 3 "t
4,000 - 5,000
+ rec.
"
"V
5,000
7,000
8,000
- 7,000
- 8,000
-10,000
1,600
400 2
800 3
400 4
roomI
i
+ rec.I"
i
8.000
10,000
12.000
- 9.000
-12,000
-14,000
(source: "GROWTH PLAN 1982")
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Medium
housing
TABL E 6:
medium housing in Neighborhood 9 would result in undesirably
dispersed settlement. 9 5 Second, they objected to building
such a large number of core flats, considering that coreflats
are a comparatively recent and untested concept. 9 6 Finally,
given current projections for industrial growth, they felt
that this supply of housing will be still inadequate to meet
the anticipated demand. 9 7
In brief, it may be seen that the housing situation is
problematic in that the city's labor force is not living
there for a variety of reasons and a large portion of the
housing stock sits empty, owned by individuals not in
residence.
"We need more housing - the factory will work
two shifts in the future and all will have to live
in Tenth of Ramadan. We are trying to get land from
the Authority to build housing for employees who
have asked to join in cooperatives and own their
apartments....We still need more housing."98
(Factory owner - Tenth of Ramadan)
One reason that workers are not living in the city is the
mere fact that there is a shortage of housing. The urgency of
this need, and the validity of the demand, is clear in the
words of the factory owner quoted above. The current
95 Ibid.
96 
-bid.
97 lhi., p. 1-10.
98 Tenth of Ramadan, Egypt, interview with factory owner.
June, 1982.
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shortage of housing has been previously addressed in the
discussion of public housing construction.
"I have been working in the city for four
years. I have been reluctant to move because the
city is lacking many services..." 9 9 (Development
Authority Employee)
While this impediment to migration is not directly part
of the issue of housing, it does reflect the fact that the
"balanced development program" sought by the planners has not
been effectively implemented. Sentiment affirming the
inadequacyof services in the city proved to be widespread in
this research, and the research team conducting the Growth
Plan study pointed to it as one of the major factors deter-
ring migration.10 0 I believe that this situation is attribu-
table to the lack of coordinated development in the city
resulting to the very form and organization of the implemen-
tation process.
"Another issue is that I don't own the
apartment in Tenth of Ramadan. It is owned by the
Authority and I've had experience with similar
cases when I worked Aswan for eleven years and I
would be moved every now and then."101 (Development
Authority employee)
99 Tenth of Ramadan Development Authority, Tenth of
Ramadan, Egypt, interview with employee, June, 1982.
100 SWECO, "Growth Plan 1982 Draft Final Report." p. 1-
14.
101 Tenth of Ramadan Development Authority, Tenth of
Ramadan, Egypt, in with employee, June, 1982.
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The method of allocating housing chosen, which reflects
the financial limits of household income in the city,
constitutes another reason that workers are not living there.
This reality stands in marked contrast to all of the planners'
studies, analyses and recommendations made in an effort to
ensure affordable housing. Realizing that the income of
employees was insufficient to purchase flats, the Development
Authority abandoned their original plan to sell them, and
instead have rented them out at a rate of approximately 15
percent of the tenants' income. 1 0 2 As the tenant must move if
employment ceases, the lack of security of tenure has
discouraqed residence. This situation suggests reference to
the issue of standards which will be addressed in the
following discussion.
"Housing is too expensive. "103 (Industrial employee)
Given the nature of the effective demand for housing in
Tenth of Ramadan, the SWECO team concluded that the housing
types already built, those being planned by the Development
Authority and those types probably to be built by cooperatives
and individuals will be beyond the financial capacity of most
102 SWECO, "Growth Plan 1982 Draft Final Report", p. 1-7.
103 lid., p. 1-13.
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of the potential future residents. 1 0 4
The issue of housing types chosen for construction in
Tenth of Ramadan is significant not only in terms of its
impact on the nature of the city's development, but also in
terms of what it suggests about the planners' place in this
story. On one level it appears that there were cultural
differences operative in terms of not only how to deal with
the problem of providing affordable shelter for the poor but
in perception of the problem in the first place. The
following quotations illustrate the planners' perspective of
the situation:
"As foreiqners, we had a better sense of the
problems of thep oor than our Egyptian upper-class
partners had."10 (Swedish Planners)
"With our colleagues there were rows. They
didn't believe our figures. They wanted changes." 0 6
(Swedish Planners)
"Affordable housing was a highly controversial
issue, there was even controversy over the likely
composition of the population." 1 0 / (Swedish Planners)
"In the original schemes there were lots of
simple housing. Our Egyptian colleagues didn't
believe that they could only afford 14m 2 per
family. 'It is not decent for an Egyptian to live
in less than 30m 2, it's even better if the poor
104 ibid., p. 3-1.
105 SWECO, Stockholm, Sweden, interview with member of
planning team, February, 1983.
106 Ibid.
107 Ibid.
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can live in 42m 2 . How can a man live in less? No,
we have to start with giving them a decent
standard.' They look at their own living situation
and don't bglieve that people could or should live
in less."1l d (Swedish Planners)
The controversy over the composition of the population
indicates a denial of the fact that it would be members of
lower income groups who would be likely to migrate to Tenth of
Ramadan in response to the industrial employment opportunities
there. At the same time, despite the very obvious inadequacy
of the living conditions of the poor in Egypt, such as in the
City of the Dead in Cairo, for example, the story here seems
to point to a sort of myopic idealism on the part of some
Egyptians who are in the position to help. Unfortunately, in
this case the idealism proved sufficiently unrealistic to by
dysfunctional in result, if it was in fact their objective to
provide adequate shelter to the poor at prices that they can
afford.
"The kind [of housing] that they have now
requires subsidies which are impossible in Egypt.
It they adopt policies demanding huge amounts of
subsidies, the majority of the population will have
less chance to get housing." 1 0 9
The final result of this disagreement over affordable
standards of housing between the Egyptian and Swedish members
108 Ibid.
109 Ibid.
61
of the planning team in terms of what kinds of housing
actually were constructed suggests the political dimensions of
this issue. Its political sensitivity is expressed in the
story of a high governmental official who was soon out of
office after attempting to initiate an affordable housing
study with an international agency. 1 1 0
"Regarding the question of housing and
planning for the poor- is difficult in Egypt. It's
a highly political question - if possible, sub-
sidies stay with the middle and upper classes." 1 ll
(Swedish Planners)
"Not just political overtones, but political
overtones in Egypt, because subsidies are granted
for expensive villas and flats."11 2 (Swedish
Planners)
The issue of housing standards and the concomitant level
of government subsidies demanded is indeed a political one
when seen in terms of an allocation of limited resources. The
political overtones of this issue are implicit in the current
housing finance system in Egypt, outlined in Figure 5, which
clearly indicates the favoring of medium and above-medium
income groups. 1 1 3
110 Ibid.
111 Ibid.
112 Ibi._d.
113 COPA and SWECO, "Conceptual Planning Report." p. I-
34.
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Figure 5
MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF THE EXISTING IIOUSING FINANCE SYSTEM IN EGYPT
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(source:
"They have an aversion to building a slum. Key
decisions were taken with no prior analysis of
consequences." (Were the decisions about housing
types made high up?) "High up? Centralized. yes, at
least as high as the closets advisors to the
Minister-" 114 (Swedish Planner)
Another issue that this situation points to is the impact
of the bureaucratic structure, particularly the problems
inherent in a system in which decision making is highly
centralized. Disregarding the political overtones of the
housing issue in the national context. with such a high degree
of centralization, the ability of the official to make a well
informed decision becomes increasingly limited.
Finally decisions made about the city's housing type
makes a strong case for the "power of image-"
"They have an idealized vision of it - a 'garden
city' but in fact if it is an Industrial city, it's
not a garden city, it's not pretty, it's denser
more informal-.. "Il5 (Foreign Consultant in Egypt)
"They still had the characteristic dreams of
creating a show case and thus didn't want to build
a slum- "11 6 (Swedish Planner)
"The architect's attitude was very much a
'showcase' one The final form of the city was an
important topic. I disagree. Development process
arguments about form were done at the expense of
114 SWECO- Stockholm. Sweden, interview with member of
planning team, February, 1983.
115 Ministry of Development COPA, Egypt- interview- June
1982.
116 SWECO- Stockholm- Sweden. interview with member of
planning team, February, 1983.
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content and the implementation process "117 (Swedish
Planner)
This appears to have been an important issue not only for the
government officials. It is evident from the visual imagery of
planning documents and the words of a non-architect member of
the planning team that this was an important consideration for
the architect/planners as well. I believe that this issue of
the image of the new town if fundamentally related to the fact
that the new town approach was the one chosen as a solution to
the problem; a potentially imageable solution to a very
visible problem of overurbanization Indeed, residents always
mentioned in the interviews conducted their enjoyment of the
greenery. low density, clean air and quiet. Faced with the
reality of urban life in Egypt, such an attitude is the
reaction that one would expect-
"The main mistake - they have allocated
apartments to whomever can pay for it, this turned
out to be people working in Arab countries who took
the apartments, paid the downpayments and closed
them and went back to these countries "118
(Egyptian Official)
As previously stated, an overwhelmingly high percentage
of the built housing is empty. Ironically, the overall housing
shortage in the country is one explanation That is, with such
117 Ibid.
118 Tenth of Ramadan D A. Tenth of Ramadan. Egypt,
interview with official, June, 1982.
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a shortage an individual is unlikely to refuse the opportunity
for home ownership when it is presented. At the same time
temporary employment in one of the oil-rich Arab countries
offering higher salaries facilitates meeting the financial
requirements of ownership. Consequently the housing remains
empty until the individual repatriates, as existing law
prohibits sub-letting. Figure 5 indicates occupied and
unoccupied housing in the city. 1 1 9
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CONCLUSION
The story of Tenth of Ramadan, specifically in terms of
its housing program, is of necessity unfinished and only the
passage of time will reveal its fate. Moreover, no pretext can
be made that the story presented here of the situation thus
far, is complete. Research done by a foreigner on a very
sensitive subject was in this case, subject to its own
constraints. Access to information involved time consuming and
often fruitless quests. Information gathered was sometimes
inadequate or marked with inconsistencies, for example in
regard to census data. It was the objective, however to
present here as complete and as accurate a picture as
possible, given the fact that in research of this nature,
there is no access to perfect information.
119 SWECO- "Growth Plan 1982 Draft Final Report", p- I-
22.
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While many of the events in the history of this new town
are unique to Tenth of Ramadan, it is suggested here that
there are certain characteristics related to the role of the
planner in this context which are generally applicable to
international practice. It is suggested that these may be
considered in terms of the lessons that they contain which
could prove useful in future, similar projects. These include
the way in which the planners' role was defined; the planners'
perception of themselves in this role of advice-giver in
relation to the context; the limits perceived by the planners
associated with this role; issues related to the nature of the
advice in terms of form and content; and the planners'
response in this case to their perceived ineffectiveness.
Definition of the Planners' Role
"They never wanted discussion on whether to go
one way or another- The Minister said that it was
SWECO's job to advise- It was impossible to get
feedback." 120 (Swedish Planner)
"We were not consulted at all when crucial
policy decisions were made. which would have made
sense. Key decisions were always taken without
prior expert analysis. It was probably viewed as
politically necessary to do that. Consultants were
told 'This is what will happen-'" 1 2 1 (Swedish
Planner)
120 SWECO- Stockholm. Sweden. interview with member of
planning team, February, 1983-
121 Ibid.
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It appears that the parameters of the planners' role in
this story were defined by the political and bureaucratic
context as that of "advice-giver " Advice-giver in this case
implied two, one-way channels of communication without benefit
of response in either direction- Advice was "sent" from the
planners in the direction of the Government. The Government
"sent" word of the results of decisions it had made in the
direction of the planners- Given the frequent lack of
correspondence between the advice and the results of political
decisions, for example in regard to the issue of affordable
housing, one could question whether or not the advice "sent"
ever "arrived."
The Planners' Self-Perception as Advice-Giver
Given the contextual definition of the planners' role as
that of advice-giver, raises the question of what the planners
considered their role as advice-giver to be. One Swedish
planner expressed in an interview the sentiment that SWECO
sometimes acted as a conscience in this scenario by maintain-
ing what they felt to be politically correct position 122 He
went on to stress that regardless of the reception of his
suggestions. "...the only way to make it correct is to tell
what I feel-"1 2 3
122 
-ibid.
123 Ibid.
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At the same time, one of the planners considered the
possibility that three consecutive commissions as 'advice-
giver' on the project could be an indication of Egyptian
confidence in his performance. However he continued with an
analogy to a film in which the Marx Brothers sold their
knowledge, then were approached for an explanation, which they
then sold, and then they were approached for an explanation
for the previous explanation, which they in turn sold, etc.
The planner concluded with the possibility that rather than a
sign of confidence, his continued involvement in this position
might represent a sign of despair 124
Another dimension to the planners' self-perception in
this role of advice-giver involves their perception of their
relation to the context. While it is clear that they consider
their position to be marginal, they've considered both
negative and the potentially positive aspects of not being
part of the context. On one hand, while one planner suggested
that in making politically unfavorable recommendations that,
"-...maybe as foreigners we have a better change." 1 2 5 The
story thus far appears to provide no support for this hope. On
the other hand, the awareness of not being part of the context
is made clear in one planners' discussion of his uncertainty
124 Ibid.
125 Ibid.
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about the intentions of some officials despite the opinions
that they express at meetings, particularly when the results
of their decisions contradict signals received by the planner.
The planners' intense realization of being outside of the
context is expressed to a certain extent in their having
ignored it in their advice-giving.
"We should perhaps have been listening to what
was realistic and adjust "126 (Swedish Planner)
"We come in and size up the problem from
scratch and try to understand the Egyptian reality
not taking into account political constraints-"127
(Swedish Planner)
To a certain extent, it appears that the planners
studied, analyzed and dissected the problem, and then offered
a solution which assumed a rational, predictable and well-
controlled context in which their suggestions would be
respected, accepted and realized. This dismissal of the impact
of the context, particularly the political context, on the
results of the planning process suggests the image of a
technician operating in a vacuum, which is clearly never the
case in the planning. The planners' recommendations in
someways appear to be characterized by an idealism which
ignored the reality of the context and expected somehow that
126 Ibid.
127 Ibid.
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the context would be responsive to the demands of the plan.
For example, in regard to housing finance, despite the nature
of the existing housing financing system, their plans were
based on assumptions that other alternatives would be made
available.
"I feel that in general everything I'm doin2
is not coming out to the result that I hope for-" 2 8
(Swedish Planner)
"The Minister isn't knowing (sic) the correct
way. He calls for our opinion. What will he do with
our report. burn it. or use it? He's clever enough
to know what's possible and what's not-" 29
(Swedish Planner)
The planners' awareness of the limited effectiveness
inherent in their marginal position is clearly reflected in
the words above. As illustrated previously, this story
contains numerous examples in which recommmendations made by
the planners were never realized, such as the land allocation
policy or the time frame for the first stage of development.
"It is even purely a language problem, few
people at Tenth of Ramadan even speak English." 1 3 0
(Swedish Planner)
"You speak one language telling them to do
'this', and the receiver doesn't understand
128 Ibid.
129 
-bid.
130 Ibid.
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'this'-"131 (Swedish Planner)
"You have to learn how to deal with all of
these other factors. While I've worked in Egypt
since 1962. I still don't understand so much, each
new town or situation is different You don't even
know if you are understanding the same things. even
if you are using the same words. you don't know if
you are meaning the same things." 1 3 2  (Swedish
Planner)
"I really thought that I knew Egypt more than
most- It's always difficult to really know." 1 3 3
Intangible in many respects, the difficulties inherent in
functioning in a different cultural context were considered in
the planners' realization of the limits to their effectiveness
in the position of advice-givers. Most obvious were the
problems resulting from the language barrier. More subtle and.
perhaps because of this, more difficult to deal with were the
communication problems resulting from different perceptions or
understandings of a situation due to different cultural
backgrounds. The different attitudes toward the provision of
housing for the poor are an example.
.Nature of the Advice: Content
"Perhaps it's our fault- we may have been too
optimistic. Maybe the rules we gave them were too
131 Ibid.
132 Ibid.
133 Ibid.
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difficult to follow-" 1 3 4
One possible explanation for the current situation
considered by the planners was the nature of their advice.
Were the prescriptions recommended too difficult to be
followed? Was their advice simply too optimistic. idealistic?
To some extent- there were inherent in the very nature of
the project certain characteristics contributing to its
current status. First of all was its grand scale in terms of
size and the nobility of its objectives, such as provision of
affordable housing to a range of income groups. This is
particularly important given the Egyptian political and
bureaucratic context and the fact that it was the first such
project attempted by the Egyptian government. As such,
simultaneous to the development of Tenth of Ramadan the
government was still in the process of creating legislation
and organizations for implementing its new urbanization
policy.
Another aspect of the nature of the project, or "context"
of the advice, which influenced its outcome, relates to the
notion of 'image'. Could it not to a certain extent be
expected that a "model city" or "garden city" attitude might
accompany the new town approach given the fact that this was
the approach chosen, as opposed to other less imageable solu-
tions to Egypt's very visible problems of over-urbanization?
134 Ibid.
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Nature of the Advice: Form
The planners also considered the form that their advice
took as a possible explanation for their limited
effectiveness. In interviews, for example, they suggested the
possiblity that reports such as the "First Stage Final Report"
might not have been read due to its length. 1 3 5 They pointed to
the degree of centralization of decision making in the
Egyptian bureaucracy, in which "everything must go through the
chairman, and therefore he must digest everything," as an
argument against their long reports. 1 3 6  They also suggested
that in response to the Egyptians' lack of experience with
such projects, perhaps they should still have done the
comprehensive background work but presented the client with
simpler, more easily understood reports. 1 3 7 Furthermore, they
suggested that perhaps the Egyptians had expected a manual to
be able to follow step by step as opposed to the kinds of
planning documents that they were given. 1 3 8
135 Ibid.
136 Ibid.
137 Ibid.
138 Ibid.
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The Planners' Response To The Limits Of Their Role as Advice-Givers
"If you have no experience, how can you do it?
Therefore- you need a group. not one time advice-
because tomorrow there will be something that is
not in the manual-" 1 3 9
"The whole project is complicated, new and
pioneering. It would be wishful thinking to believe
that a few one-time pieces of advice would be
enough-"
"The implementation of Tenth of Ramadan for
the coming decade needs a strong and flexible
management, using the utmost of available knowledge
and experience. The present organization should for
a limited period be given extra assistance and
extra resources. 1 4 0
In both interviews and "Growth Plan 1982," the planners
suggested thatthe Egyptians have viewed the first stage of
development of the new town as one large construction project-
In contrast they stress the vital need for an effective
management system, referring to the lack of managerial skills
evidencedin the form that development has thus far taken. 1 4 1
In "Growth Plan 1982." they outline four "overruling
recommendations." 1 4 2  In addition to the repeatedly stressed
recommendations, "Balanced Growth," "Independent Growth," and
139 Ibid.
140 SWECO- "Growth Plan 1982 Draft Final Report", p- iii
141 SWECO- Stockholm. Sweden- interview with member of
planning team, February, 1983-
142 SWECO- "Growth Plan 1982 Draft Final Report", p- iii
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"Rapid Growth," the list now includes "High Class Management
Assistance." 1 4 3 This recommendation indicated the planners'
response to their experiences in the role of advice-giver.
Ironic, however, is the fact that this is adyice. With the
planners' role unchanged, any recommendation will continue to
carry the weight of a mere recommendation. The level of
realization of previous recommendations is illustrated in the
number of such recommendations finding repetition yet again in
the latest report. "Growth Plan 1982." Given the reputedly
poor reception of the report in Cairo and suspicion concerning
the management recommendations, could one not consider this
report just like all of the previous recommendations in terms
of the lack of concern with political feasibility or palat-
ability that it indicates? This is especially true given the
implications of suggestions about management assistance.
Moreover. "Growth Plan 1982" abounds with the same recommenda-
tions found in previous documents generated by the planners.
such as the need to rectify the land allocation situation, the
creation of alternative means of housing finance, or the
creation of a building materials pool and provision of
"technical assistance for housing construction activities."1 4 4
However, at this point it must be remembered
143 Ibid., p- viii
144 Ibid., p. xi.
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that the results of the recommendations presented in the
"Growth Plan 1982" remain to be seen.
Recommendations
This research on Tenth of Ramadan initially involved
looking at the contrast between the current situation and the
proposed plans as a result of the constraints on
implementation, those being physical, financial, bureaucratic,
institutional, cultural, etc. Consequently, the interviews
conducted in Egypt were with officials involved in the
implementation process and those presently dealing with the
results of previous implementation decisions. These interviews
mainly focused exclusively on the implementation process --
events that occurred and decisions that were made that
impacted the status of the development of the new town to
date. The implementation theme again ran through the
interviews with the Swedish planners. However, they also
included an attempt to get a sense of the planners' "story of
what happened."
However, through time, as my understanding and thinking
evolved, it became apparent that the story was speaking more
to the issue of the role of the foreign planning consultant.
It appeared that the "implementation constraints" perspective
was a limited one. Rather, Tenth of Ramadan, in this case
concentrating on housing, was a story about a particular type
of planning.
Consequently, in retrospect if this had been the
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perspective of the research at its initiation, other actors
and other issues would have been included. To begin with both
Shawky-Zeitoun and COPA, the Egyptian planning firms would
have been interviewed. Issues addressed would have included
the following: the actual nature of their relationship to the
project, with their Swedish counterparts and with the
government organizations involved; what they perceived their
role to be; what they considered to be their capacities and
limits in this role; what their expectations from SWECO were;
in what ways they perceived themselves to be similar and
different from SWECO in their involvement in the project; what
were the advantages and disadvantages they perceived
themselves as having because they were Egyptians; and how
these differences and similarities, advantages and
disadvantages were expressed in the context of the project.
Secondly, in interviewing the Egyptian government
officials the following areas would have been addressed: their
understanding and expectations of the planners role, i.e. the
Egyptian and Swedish planners. including their limits and
capacities; any differences in expectations that they had
between the Egyptians and Swedish planners; what they saw
their own role to be in this story, including its limits and
capacities; what they perceived their relationship with the
planners to be; what if any were the differences between this
and other planning projects that they'd been involved-
Thirdly, while many of these issues came out in
interviews with members of the Swedish team, I would have
explicitly asked: where they saw themselves fit into this
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picture; what they considered their role to be; how this
differed from the roles that they have played in other
planning stories in Sweden and in the developing world;
whether they saw their role as being that of "advice-giver",
and if so what does this really mean to them; what advice
would they give to other planners in similar situations, such
as those foreign consultants working on other Egyptian new
towns as a result of their experiences; what would they have
done differently; and how they perceived their relationship
with the Egyptian officials involved in implementation.
Finally, I would have interviewed the planners, both
Egyptian and foreign involved in the other new town projects
presently underway, such as Sadat City and El Obour.
Addressing issues previously outlined, I would have looked for
consistencies, discrepancies and evidence of learning from the
Tenth of Ramadan experience-
The comprehensive picture that such a study could
potentially provide, would be likely to generate a set of
recommendations to foreign consultants involved in similar
situations. However, recognizing the limits of the present
study, it might still be possible to propose certain
recommendations.
First of all given the overall nature of Tenth of Ramadan
as an EVENT in context of the process of urbanization in
Egypt. as exemplified in the new and special legislation and
organizations created on its behalf, efforts might have been
made to make components of the EVENT less alien and obtrusive
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and more part of the on-going existing processes- For
example, the housing program proposed was foreign to the
reality of the existing housing process and demanded for its
success certain institutional changes, such as changes in the
housing finance system and government housing policy. In this
regard, it appears that plans were reduced to the level of
expectations, without benefit of actions to be taken to
increase the likelihood of their outcome. Thus, one
recommendation might be that the foreign planning consultant
maintain an acute awareness of the limits of the context to
change to accommodate their plans and also assess the on-
going processes in terms of their political and institutional
impacts in order to determine their flexible points and thus
design interventions more conducive to the on-going processes
and potentially more politically feasible-
The planners in this case explicitly admitted that they
had not taken into consideration in their planning the
political constraints influencing its outcome. Consequently,
such recognition must be stressed as a fundamental
recommendation. Furthermore, in their retrospection, they
realized that their plans should have shown a greater
reflection and indeed responsiveness to the Egyptian reality.
However abstract in concept- the recommendation that this
admission suggests is vital to any planning process,
especially in the international context-
Although general in nature, I believe that these few
recommendations would be potentially applicable to specific
issues and could indeed contribute to a more effective
planning process-
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